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for instance). In addition, our analysis suggests that disparities between the definition of a particular parameter contained in the survey questionnaire and the perception of respondents as to the definition of a particular parameter could also bias the results of the TRE scores (as for instance in the USOs category).
In general however, what emerges from our analysis is that market behavior -specific actions taken by operators -in spite of bad regulatory and policy actions -facilitated by the dynamics of competition, is driving the telecom sector. Initial pro-competitive reforms and liberalization efforts from 1980 until the mid-late 1990s created a momentum for competition that appears to have taken off, by-passing regulation.
The policy recommendations emerging from our analysis focus on the principles regulation only where necessary; and, regulation for competition. For instance, we argue that areas such as tariff regulation and QoS should be left to the market -according to the tenets of consumer choice and revealed preference, whilst areas such as interconnection, licensing and access to scarce resources need to be addressed in a systematic and transparent basis by the regulator.
Methodology and Limitations
The TRE instrument, which is a diagnostic tool designed to assess the efficacy of regulation and policies pertaining to a particular country's telecom sector was developed by LIRNEasia and is set out in detail in was attached to the questionnaire (Annex 2) to provide some context to the survey.
The respondents of the TRE survey were divided into three categories as set out below:
• Category 1: Stakeholders directly affected by telecom sector regulation (such as operators, industry associations, equipment suppliers and investors)
• Category 2: Stakeholders who analyze the sector with broader interest (such as equity research analysts, credit rating agencies, telecom consultants and law firms)
• Category 3: Stakeholders with an interest in improving the sector to help the public (such as academics, research organizations, journalists, telecom user groups, civil society, former members of regulatory and other government agencies, donors, current government employees with knowledge on the telecom sector EXCLUDING those directly in the telecom regulatory and policy hierarchy -i.e. excludes anyone from the TRC and the Ministry of Posts and Telecom)
The total sample size of the survey was 124 and the response rate was 78.22 percent.
The survey was conducted via different modes: online (web and email) and paper (in-person and fax). The rates of response categorized mode-wise indicate that a majority of the respondents (53.60%) preferred a web-based survey.
The response rates for Category 1, 2 and 3 were 58%, 79% and 91% respectively; stakeholders that are most directly impacted by telecom sector regulation showed the lowest rate of response, relatively. Informal conversations with this category of stakeholders -in particular telecom sector operators -suggests that this group is rather skeptical, perceiving such exercises in relation to telecom sector regulation as being futile; several stakeholders in this category indicated that any positive outcome in sector performance, particularly in recent years, was in spite of bad regulation and policy.
As per the TRE methodology each category must contribute equally to the final score.
However, given that it is not always practically possible to obtain an equal number of respondents from each category, we use weights to equalize the contributions per category. These weights are shown in Table 1 . The limitations we encountered in running the TRE survey in Sri Lanka are as follows:
• The operators -coming within the category directly affected by telecom sector regulation and policy -were the most difficult to get responses from.
• Specific questions were left unanswered -for example, questions on broadband interconnection and on USOs were left unanswered by most respondents.
• Respondents tended to misunderstand terms used in the survey -for instance, several respondents failed to keep in mind that the TRE assessment is on the regulation of the market rather than on market performance per se.
• Inability to obtain important, relevant and up to date indicator data from the TRC -the reason we were given was that there was an "internal technical malfunction" at the TRC.
Development of the Telecom Regulatory and Policy Environment
The This section of the report focuses on the development of the regulatory and policy environment in Sri Lanka as shown in Table 2 VSNL (a subsidiary of India's USD 29 billion Tata Group) that obtained an EGO license in 2003, commences operations in the international wholesale voice and data markets; TRC decision on the implementation of CPP was reversed by the ex-officio Chair of the Commission just hours before a news conference to announce a shift from RPP to CPP (the alleged reason given by the Chair was the political ramifications of the decision just before an election); Public hearing was held on the decision , the public hearing committee counted the number of pro and con submissions and concluded that the public was against CPP (although evidence pointed to the fact that the con submissions were orchestrated by a union) 2005 CDMA frequencies assigned; Court case between seven operators and ICTA with regard to alleged exclusivity clauses in regional telecom network licenses; Consumer lobby takes TRC and SLTL to court over 5th (final) Mobile subs levy extended to non-mobile wireless phones (CDMA); Malaysia's Usaha Tegas (UT) group bought over NTT's shares in SLTL (35.2%), GOSL shares in SLTL reduced to 49.5% with the balance 15.3% shares being owned by SLTL employees and the public; VSNL, which has 30% of Sri Lanka's outgoing voice traffic, rebrands itself as Tata Communications (Lanka) in a corporate strategy aimed at expanding its international service portfolio -in particular to leverage the Tata Global Network (one of the most advanced submarine and IP networks) to meet the country's demand for converged IP solutions; Lanka Bell invests Rs.3 billion to link to the 65,000 km FLAG undersea global fiber optic network owned by India's Reliance group.
Source: Complied using information from the TRC and from key stakeholders in the telecom sector. Source: TRC and industry information gathered from key stakeholders in the telecom sector. Moreover, as shown in Table 3 The direct benefits that the telecom sector has on the public are illustrated in Knight-John, 2007) . As at the time of writing moreover, Sri Lanka's second largest fixed access provider, Lanka Bell, has announced that it will pay back subscribers that receive international calls 50 cents for every minute, regardless of country of origin, number of calls received per day or call duration. Whilst company representatives describe this action as one of passing on some of the benefits from its Rs.3 billion investment in the FLAG undersea fiber optic cable network to its users, it is also clear that this move is a competitive strategy aimed at growing Lanka Bell's international telephony market.
Research conducted by LIRNEasia benchmarking mobile tariffs in South Asia -using OECD "basket methodology" 4 -also shows that Sri Lanka had relatively low mobile broadband business connection and relatively low prices for a 256kbps broadband residential connection. 5 However, the benefits of lower costs are offset to some extent by the quality of broadband service in the country, with users actually getting less than the advertised download speeds they pay for. 6 As illustrated in Figure 3 moreover, the number of broadband subscribers lags behind internet subscribers, with dial-up being the more widespread mode of connecting to the internet.
Currently, SLTL has a legal monopoly on the provision of ADSL services. However, there is some degree of competition in the market with operators providing broadband services using wireless technologies -for instance Lanka Bell and Dialog (WiMax) and 
Note:
Calculated based on subscriber numbers. Source: Industry sources. 
Calculated based on subscriber numbers. Source: Industry sources.
The development of Sri Lanka's telecom sector from one where it was a drain on public resources to one that is now one of the most important sub-sectors of the economy can be attributed to three key factors. First, early, pro-competitive reforms beginning in 1980 and continuing up to about the mid-late 1990s gave Sri Lanka an edge in terms of telecom sector performance -for instance, the outcome of the threat of contestability it can be argued that progress has been made on the policy front by making the telecom tax technology neutral, the question remains as to the long-term rationality of taxing a sector that as pointed out in Table 3 above is already amongst the top contributors to the Treasury.
The imposition of telecom-specific taxes combined with the tripling of spectrum charges and macroeconomic factors such as rising inflation and high interest rates appear to already have had an impact on players such as Dialog -which has reported a loss of 192.4 million rupees for the September 2008 quarter, largely due to hemorrhages in its pay TV segment; and, Hutch -which has also reported a fall in profits and revenue growth. Moreover, research by LIRNEasia -(see for instance, de Silva and Zainudeen, 2008) shows that access to telecom services have a significant impact on users at the BOP; in the event that telecom taxes impact on affordability it is these poorest users that will be affected the most. The results of the 2008 TRE survey, as depicted in Figure 5 , show that the mobile sector receives higher scores than the fixed sector for all dimensions excepting interconnection.
Results and Analysis of the TRE Survey for Sri Lanka
Overall Scores
In addition, the broadband sector lags behind both the fixed and mobile sectors in all but one of the parameters (regulation of anti-competitive practices). What also emerges in the results illustrated above is that all the sectors -other than mobile sector USOs -fall below the 3.00 average performance level. These scores are analyzed in detail -in the context of the policy and regulatory developments and market dynamics in the telecom sector highlighted in Section 3 -in the rest of this Section.
Market Entry
The TRE questionnaire for 2008 (contained in Annex 2), defines the scope of market entry largely in terms of the transparency of licensing and licensing conditions. As illustrated in Figure 6 , the scores for all three sectors -fixed, mobile and broadbandindicate below average performance. What is more interesting however is the picture that emerges in Figure 7 -which compares market entry scores for 2006 and 2008 -indicating a significant drop in the scores pertaining to the mobile sector (3.1 to 2.8). We argue that the drop in mobile sector TRE scores between 2006 and 2008 is a result of specific regulatory actions described in Table 2 
Access to scarce resources
An analysis of the TRE questionnaire responses that we received suggests that a majority of the respondents perceived access to scarce resources in terms of spectrum/frequency allocation and rights of way. As shown in Figure 8 , all three sub-sectors show dismal performance in this category -as also indicated in Table 5 above, the 2008 TRE scores for scarce resources in the fixed sector is the lowest amongst the seven parameters. A key issue in terms of rights of way that may well explain the low TRE scores for the access to scarce resources parameter, is the fact that SLTL has exclusive access to the nation-wide optic fiber network (see Annex 6). As at the time of writing, there has been no regulatory or policy initiative to derive a cost-effective solution for other operators to access this backbone; infrastructure sharing is not mandated by the TRC. An example of market solutions that bypass regulatory inaction is reflected in the case of the Lanka Bell purchase of the FLAG global undersea cable -which effectively ended SLTL's exclusive hold in this segment.
Interconnection
The key elements contained in the TRE survey questionnaire on interconnection included the following: interconnection with a major operator being ensured at any technically to the GATS Reference Paper (Dharmawardena, 2004) . The TRC has failed to implement these Rules effectively -as seen in for instance in the interconnection issues faced by the EGOs highlighted in Table 2 above; in the Bharti Airtel case; and, in the discriminatory stance with respect to interconnection rates -with mobile operators providing free termination services to fixed operators (cross-subsidizing these from origination services) and fixed operators effectively getting a free ride on mobile networks (paying termination fees only to other fixed operators and not to mobile operators).
This informal free-riding arrangement between the fixed operators could perhaps be the reason for the higher 2008 TRE scores that this sector shows in comparison to the mobile sector. However, the improved scores for both sectors between the two survey periods remains puzzling -and does run contrary to (bad/ineffective) policy and regulatory actions on interconnection.
Tariff Regulation
The TRE survey questionnaire defined this parameter as the regulation of tariffs charged As per our interviews with industry stakeholders, the TRC does not in general intervene in the tariff packages and pricing strategies adopted by mobile operators (although it has the authority to advise the GOSL on tariffs as per the law). It is highly unlikely that this hand-off approach adopted by the TRC, which has largely been the practice in any case in the past with respect to the mobile sector, has any bearing on the lower 2008 TRE scores for mobile tariff regulation -implying a gap between regulatory and policy actions and the TRE data.
Even if market dynamics -as opposed to regulatory and policy actions -were to explain the TRE scores for this parameter, the dropping of prices in the mobile sector in 2008
would indicate a higher score between the two survey periods. As such, our analysis in the case of this parameter can only conclude that no meaningful explanation can be derived with respect to the fall in mobile sector TRE scores for this parameter either in terms of regulatory and policy actions or in the context of market dynamics.
Regulation of anti-competitive practices
The TRE questionnaire used for this survey included elements such as anti-competitive cross-subsidization, excessive prices, price discrimination and predatory pricing, refusal to deal with other operators and the sharing of towers and facilities by a parent company and subsidiaries in different segments of the market. The TRE scores for 2008 shown in 
USOs
The key element defining the regulation of USOs as per the TRE questionnaire was the administration of the USO fund in a transparent, non-discriminatory and competitively neutral manner. As illustrated in Figures 16 and 17 and as is pointed out in Table 5 above, this category performs relatively well in all three sectors, with mobile sector scores recording above average performance in 2008 and both the fixed and mobile sectors showing improved scores between the two survey periods. What is worrisome in this regard however, is the fact that a majority of the respondentsdespite being informed stakeholders -were not aware of the details of Sri Lanka's USO fund. The practice in Sri Lanka since 2003, as gazetted by the GOSL, has been to use levies on international calls for the USO fund; a third of the income earned from a 1 minute international call (0.9 USD) is to be allocated for the fund. In view of the fact that this fund has been in place since 2003 and that the number of international traffic minutes has grown enormously since then, the fund is estimated (by industry analysts that do have information on the fund) to amount to billions of rupees. As per the gazette pertaining to the USO fund, these monies were to be re-distributed amongst operators as they achieved universal service targets set out in their licenses -for instance a particular number of connections in rural locations. As at the time of writing however, the USO fund has not been disbursed -with industry sources citing suspicions that these monies are being utilized for fiscal purposes rather than for the improvement of universal access.
QoS
The principal feature defining QoS in the survey questionnaire was the actual performance of a service with respect to what is promised. As shown in Figure 18 below, the TRE scores for the fixed and mobile sectors indicate relatively good performance (although marginally below the half-way mark) in this parameter. However, the broadband sector lags behind both the other sectors. We attribute the lower performance in QoS in the broadband sector to the gaps between advertized and actual speeds highlighted in Section 3 above. 
Conclusions and Recommendations
The analysis contained in Sections three and four of this report leads to three key conclusions. First, growth and service expansion in the telecom sector and its evolution over the years to become one of the leading contributors to GDP and government revenue However, our research leads us to several key policy recommendations with respect to the telecom sector. First, given that improvements in the sector have largely been a result of competition and liberalization -as argued also in Section 3 above -the TRC needs to follow the basic principles of regulating only when necessary and regulating for competition. Following from this tenet we argue that areas such as tariff regulation and
QoS be left to the market forces of consumer choice and revealed preference.
Second, policy makers need to place the effective implementation of the GATS Reference Paper as a top priority in their agenda -a necessary action which has been lacking across successive policy regimes. This includes the following regulatory actions:
• Enforcing transparent licensing procedures
• Moving from an ad hoc administration of spectrum to auctions -which are a more transparent means of allocating and refarming frequencies and reducing the opportunities for rents
• Putting in place a cost-effective access sharing mechanism that would enable operators to share essential facilities such as the national backbone infrastructure Policy recommendations aside -and this applies across the board to all sectors and not merely the telecom sector -Sri Lanka has in general displayed a significant gap between policy rhetoric and actual implementation due to lapses in governance. In the final instance therefore, what actually gets implemented depends on interest group and stakeholder dynamics -and in particular political buy-in at the top levels of government.
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Annex 2: TRE Questionnaire
Questionnaire Number: ………………
Telecom Regulatory Environment for Sri Lanka
You are kindly requested to make your frank assessments of the telecom regulatory environment (TRE) for the year 12 months ending May,2008 for the fixed, mobile and broadband telecom sectors on a five-point scale.
The dimensions used in this questionnaire are broadly based on the WTO Regulatory Reference Paper (GATS Protocol 4) and are briefly described below. A fact-sheet of key events in the Telecom Regulatory Environment is also attached for your reference for the period May 2007-May 2008.
Completing the Questionnaire should take less than 5 minutes of your time. Please email the completed questionnaire to dilani@ips.lk or fax it to 0112431395. If you prefer, you can complete the same survey online.
Dimension Aspects Covered Market Entry
Transparency of licensing. Applicants should know the terms, conditions, criteria and length of time needed to reach a decision on their application. License conditions. Exclusivity issues.
Scarce Resources
Timely, transparent and non-discriminatory access to spectrum allocation. Numbering and rights of way: frequency allocation, telephone number allocation, tower location rights. Interconnection
Interconnection with a major operator should be ensured at any technically feasible point in the network. Quality of interconnection comparable to similar services offered by own network. Reasonable rates for interconnection. Administration of the universal service program/fund in a transparent, nondiscriminatory and competitively neutral manner and is not more burdensome than necessary for the kind of universal service defined by the policymakers.
Quality of Service (QoS)
The actual performance of a service with respect to what is promised, depending upon the network traffic control mechanisms. Specific criteria may be call quality (for mobile and fixed), connection speeds or throughput (for broadband)
FIXED SECTOR Telecom Regulatory Environment, for May, 2007 -May, 2008
Please TICK the number that best represents the quality of the regulatory environment for each dimension. The lower number represents Highly Ineffective and the higher number represents Highly Effective. If you feel you do not have sufficient information about a particular question, you may choose to leave it blank. 
